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The Policy Implications
Elizabeth McCallum I
Good afternoon everybody. I want to thank the
JOURNAL for inviting me. It is an honor to be here in such
distinguished company.
I knew that the Tennessee v. Lane2 decision was a
tremendously important case to the millions of Americans
with disabilities, and I knew it was very interesting to
lawyers because of the complexity of the legal issues
involved. However, I did not realize how well-known the
case was in Tennessee until this morning when I was in a
taxicab on the way to the symposium from the airport. My
taxi driver asked why I was going to the law school. I said
I am going to speak in a symposium on the Supreme Court
decision in Tennessee v. Lane. He said, "I know that case,
that is the case where the guy was in a wheelchair and had
to crawl up the stairs to get to the courthouse . . .." I
thought, wow, even the taxi driver knows about it. He said
"I have a view on the case." Being used to D.C. cab drivers
I was not sure I wanted to ask what his view was, but I took
my life in my hands and asked. He said, "I think it is very
simple. We can make Burger Kings accessible, why can't
we make courthouses accessible?" I was strongly reminded
of that comment when Mr. Lane told us about his K.I.S.S.
motto earlier today.
I have to start with a caveat here. I am an antitrust
lawyer, not a civil rights lawyer. I became involved in this
case when my firm was lucky enough to be asked to
participate in writing an amicus brief in the first of the
sovereign immunity ADA cases in the Supreme Court, the
1 Elizabeth McCallum is a partner at Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White,
LLP, in Washington, D.C.
2 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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Garrett case.3 I was pulled in on that brief, and then we
wrote another amicus brief in the Hason,4 the California
case that was dismissed. Then we wrote another amicus
brief in Lane, and in that case the plaintiffs finally got their
win.
The amicus briefs we drafted in Garrett, Hason, and
Lane focused on the history of state-sponsored
discrimination against people with disabilities. Our goal
was to focus on the portion of the City of Boerne case that
says Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment as a response to a pervasive history
of state-sponsored discrimination or unconstitutional
behavior in the area. 5 We tried to focus our Lane brief in
response to some of the points the Court made in Garrett
about the kind of evidence that Congress could look at and
should consider when it is deciding whether to abrogate
sovereign immunity. We tried to focus on cases of
discrimination with the state as actor. We tried to focus on
instances that rose to the level of constitutional violations.
We tried to focus on not just some of the horrible things
that happened in the early years of the century, but also
things that happened close to the time when the ADA was
enacted.
In our Lane brief, we described a whole spectrum of
that kind of discrimination against people with disabilities.
Of course, we focused on discrimination in the provision of
judicial services and access to the courts, telling stories
similar to the stories that Ms. Jones and Mr. Lane told
about individuals being denied access to our judicial system
and buildings. We provided evidence of both individual
cases of discrimination against individuals in the judicial
system and also systemic, structural barriers that prevented
3 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
4 Med. Bd. of Cal. v. Hason, 538 U.S. 958 (2003).
5 City of Boere v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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access to courthouses. We also focused more broadly on a
number of other instances of state-sponsored discrimination
outside the specific context of judicial access. That
included discrimination in access to polling places and in
the ability to vote. It included discrimination in jury
service. It included some of the shameful history Ms.
Millett referred to of state sterilization of people with
disabilities. We described statutes, some still on the books,
that prevent people from disabilities from obtaining
marriage licenses and marrying freely. And, of course,
there are some heart wrenching instances that we described
of awful treatment of people with disabilities in institutions,
both people who are institutionalized unnecessarily and
people with disabilities who suffer horribly from
inappropriate and cruel treatment while they are
institutionalized and in prisons.
We were tremendously gratified and happy when
some of the instances of the history of state sponsored
discrimination that we talked about in our brief were some
of the same instances that Justice Stevens mentioned in his
majority opinion in Lane.6  I certainly do not mean to
suggest our brief was the only one that described these
kinds of instances. We were writing an amicus brief, so
our role was to amplify one important issue of the case
while the parties and the attorney general focused on the
broader implications. There were a number of briefs that
contained these kinds of descriptions, including the
fabulous brief that the Department of Justice prepared.
Here is one thing that was tremendously interesting
to me, and brings me to my substantive point about the
policy implications of Lane. As I told you, we worked on
the same brief recounting the history of state-sponsored
discrimination in the Garrett case and in the Hason case as
we did in the Lane case. It seems to me that the record in
Garrett presented a very similar set of historical facts about
6 541 U.S. at 524-27.
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the history of state-sponsored employment discrimination
against people with disabilities as the record in Lane
presented with respect to discrimination against people
with disabilities in the court system. There was the same
rich and substantive record before Congress when it
enacted Title I of the ADA that states had discriminated
against people with disabilities in employment as there was
when it enacted Title II that states had discriminated
against people with disabilities in the provision of public
facilities. But Garrett came out one way; Lane came out
the other way. Why the difference? I think that the
specific legislative findings that Congress issued in support
of Title II were helpful, as was the fact that the issue
involved in Lane was a deprivation of a fundamental right,
access to the courthouse. I also think that the two opinions,
Lane and Garrett, evidence in some aspects a
fundamentally different approach to analysis of the
legislative record. These different approaches may create
some uncertainty for litigants and lower courts.
What is certain after Lane? Plaintiffs now can sue
states for damages under the ADA for issues related to
access to the courts and the judicial system. That is certain,
and that is a tremendously important and a very significant
victory for people with disabilities. Also after Lane there is
far more scope for litigants to argue for an expansive
reading of the history of discrimination in the legislative
and public record. But the differences in the Lane and
Garrett approach to the analysis may continue to create
uncertainty about what courts can look at to determine if a
particular claim passes muster and what that evidence
means.
What are some of these differences? First, the
Garrett majority opinion, in a manner similar to Judge
Rehnquist's dissent in Lane, seemed to assume that the
historical record that Congress is required to consider when
it abrogates sovereign immunity is similar to the judicial
record a court would need to make a decision in a specific
4
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case. Lane, in contrast, took a more expansive view of the
kind of evidence in the legislative record and the historical
record that will suffice for the requisite pattern and practice
of discrimination. It is more a difference of tone than of
anything actually articulated in the opinion, but the Lane
opinion was considerably more accepting of the concept
that Congress acts like a Congress. Congress is a
legislative body; it is supposed to consider all sorts of
evidence from the social and historical record; and it does
not have to develop a quasi-judicial record when enacting
legislation.
Second, I think the Garrett opinion seemed to
suggest that only evidence related to the statute at issue
counted, i.e., evidence in Garrett of state-sponsored
discrimination in employment. The Lane Court, although it
limited its holding to upholding Title II "as applied" to
access to the courts, also looked at evidence of past
discrimination from a whole variety of other areas and
concluded that that evidence showed that Title II as a whole
was enacted in the face of that extensive evidence.
7
Third, the Garrett opinion seemed to indicate that
any evidence of discrimination needed to be by the state
acting as a state. In contrast, the Lane Court, in a footnote,
recognized that local municipality activity, when the
7 "Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal
treatment in the administration of state services and programs,
including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights," citing
discrimination in the areas of voting rights, institutionalization,
marriage, education, jury service, and others, id. at 524-25; "Given the
sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of
unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the
provision of public services, the dissent's contention that the record is
insufficient to justify Congress' exercise of its prophylactic power is
puzzling, to say the least," id. at 528; legislative finding, "together with
the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes
clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services
and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for
prophylactic legislation," id. at 529.
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locality is acting as an arm of a state "counts" for purposes
of the sovereign immunity analysis.
8
Where are litigants and courts after Lane with
respect to the necessity of a historical record of
discrimination before Congress? It is like the proverbial
man feeling the elephant, everybody touches a different
place and comes to a different conclusion. After Lane and
Garrett, each side is going to argue its own particular view
of how you look at the historical record. In the end, the
Lane view is the correct one-Congress should not be
required to act like a court when it is enacting legislation.
In conclusion, Lane was a historic decision, one that
represented a significant victory for the plaintiffs and for all
people with disabilities. Thanks so much for the
opportunity to share my thoughts about this case with you
today.
81d. at 527 n.16.
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